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INVESTMENT POLICIES IN THE GATT
ABSTRACT
Host country policies toward inward direct investment can
have predictable effects on trade flows.Trade related
investment measures' (TRIMs) such as local-content requirements
and minimum-export requirements have recently come under official
scrutiny in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. This
paper examines the economic and political context of the Uruguay
Round negotiations on TRIMs. In the negotiations, investment
measures have been treated as a particular instance of a broader
problem: the proliferation of nontariff trade distortions. As
with other trade distortions, the negotiating strategy has been
to identify specific policies to be proscribed or limited.
However, this approach ignores the typical interactions between
multinational firms and host governments. Observed investment
regimes are often the result of a lengthy and complex bargaining
process. While some investment regimes actually alter the
allocation of resources in production and trade, others affect
mainly the distribution of rents between firms and host
countries. In particular, the trade impact, if any, depends as
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Nearly all countries make efforts to attract inward direct
investment. At the same time, most also impose limits on access and
otherwise restrict the activities of foreign-controlled companies within
their borders. This carrot-and-stick approach can have important
consequences for the location of economic activity and for the
efficiency of that activity in any given location. In particular,
investment policies can have predictable effects on trade flows similar
to those of policies aimed explicitly at trade: reducing imports,
expanding exports, or both.
Along with other nontariff measures that influence trade flows,
investment policies have become more conspicuous in recent decades.
As successive rounds of negotiations within the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) have achieved major reductions in the role
played by the more straightforward trade-influencing policies, a major
but unanticipated result has been expanded use of investment
measures and other opaque" forms of protection as alternative means
to achieve national objectives. Because of this substitution, the central
trade-liberalization goal of the GAU may not be attainable without
limits on at least some types of national policies toward direct
investment.2
The Uruguay Round was the first GAU round to attempt
negotiations on policies toward foreign direct investment. While some
past agenda items (e.g., subsidies) have been comparable in their
importance to members' perceived ability to control economic activity
within their borders, none has been such a core issue in terms of
national sovereignty. In the case of direct investment, the policies in
question are aimed specifically at controlling the extent and character
of foreign production within the nation's own boundaries. Moreover,
by its very nature, direct investment tends to be concentrated in sectors
of the economy that conform least well to the paradigm of perfect
competition. Thus, standard arguments for free trade are least likely to
apply without significant qualification.
This paper examines the economic and political context of the
Uruguay Round negotiations on investment measures. Within the
GATT, investment measures have been treated as a particular instance
of a broader problem: the proliferation of nontariff trade distortions.
However, this approach ignores the interaction between multinational
firms and governments that is typical when host countries seek to
regulate direct investment. Observed investment measures are often
the end result of a bargaining process. A central issue is whether
investment regimes actually alter the allocation of resources in3
production and trade or merely the distribution of rents between firms
and host countries. The analysis in this paper underscores that trade
impact depends as much on economic conditions as on the specific
combination of investment measures imposed.
GATT INITIATIVES ON INVESTMENT
Given its nature and purpose, the GAU is far from being the
obvious forum for discussion of issues related to foreign direct
investment (FDI). Indeed, inclusion of investment policies on the
agenda for the Uruguay Round negotiations was itself a major break
with past practice and strongly opposed by some capital-importing
nations. In the Uruguay Round, consideration has been limited to a
subset of investment policies known as "trade related investment
measures" (TRIMs). These include local content requirements,
minimum export requirements, and similar regulations tied specifically
to the trade practices of multinational firms, along with other policies
that may have a less explicit but nonetheless significant influence on
trade flows through their effects on the location of production.
The success of the GAiT as a vehicle for promoting open
markets for internationally traded goods has rested from the start on a
delicate balance between two conflicting goals of member nations:4
securing the acknowledged collective benefits of freer trade and
integrated global markets (more precisely and from the mercantilistic
perspective of most negotiators, securing improved access to old and
new export markets) while sacrificing a minimum of national
sovereignty. Until the Tokyo Round, the balance between these goals
was achieved by concentrating liberalization efforts on national policy
measures that affect goods "at the border," primarily tariffs. Yet the
acclaimed success of these efforts in slashing most tariffs brought
about notably less success in achieving the ultimate goal of freer trade.
Rather, the role of nontariff trade distortions became increasingly
prominent.
Some nontariff policies had already been in place but now
loomed larger as tariff barriers shrank. To a considerable extent,
however, the very success of the GATT in limiting the use of' tariffs led
member nations to substitute other measures from the shortened menu
of allowed policy instruments. In turn, countermeasures initially aimed
at these nontariff barriers themselves blossomed into further distortions
of trade flows, as in the case of countervailing and anti-dumping
duties. The Tokyo Round and Uruguay Round were thus required to
tackle a wide range of nontariff policies and practices. Even when this
is not their primary intent, these measures can have a significant5
distorting impact on trade flows.1
Within the GATT framework, there are two possible approaches
to dealing with investment-related issues. The first, already
implemented in a number of cases, is to apply existing GATT articles to
situations arising from national or subnational investment policies.
This approach focuses on the possible trade-distorting effects of the
policies rather than the policies themselves. For example, the United
States was successful in arguing before a GATT panel that local
content requirements imposed by Canada's Foreign Investment Review
Agency violated Article XXIII. However, the panel did not agree with
the U.S. contention that Canadian export performance requirements for
foreign investors violated GATT rules.
The second approach, as pursued in the Uruguay Round by the
United States, is to negotiate new agreements that broaden GATT
authority to deal with specific policies not previously covered by GATT
rules. In practice, this strategy concentrates on enumerating
proscribed, suspect, and acceptable policies toward direct investments.
But, because a method that singles out unacceptable policies has the
proven disadvantage of promoting the substitution of less-transparent
alternatives, it may be more the form than the fact of protection which
is thereby controlled. The Uruguay Round negotiations on investment6
were initiated at the insistence of U.S.-based multinational firms and
labor groups, at a time when policy concerns within the United States
were still focused mainly on outward investments by U.S. firms.
Complaints highlighted the presumed effects on U.S. production and
profits of performance requirements imposed by a number of less-
developed host countries and by Canada under the Foreign Investment
Review Act.
Ironically, U.S. efforts within the GATT started to bear fruit
just when direct investments by European, Canadian, and Japanese
finns in the United States had begun a period of rapid growth, and
U.S. policy concerns had become more aligned with those of other host
countries. By the mid-].980s, the United States had emerged as the
world's largest host country in terms of the total value of inward direct
investment. Yet the United States continued to be the main advocate
of GATT restrictions on TRIMs, even while the Congress contemplated
new policies to monitor and regulate the activities of foreign companies
within U.S. borders.
A GAU FOR INVESTMENT?
Proceeding within the GAiT framework implies at best a
partial remedy for the efficiency losses that may arise from national7
policies toward direct investment. In particular, any GAT1' action must
be justified in terms of significant effects on trade. Rather than trying
to shoe-horn investment issues into the GATT framework at all (over
the vehement objections of some less-developed host countries), why
not treat the problem separately in a logical and comprehensive
fashion?
For many years there have been calls for a new international
forum that would oversee foreign direct investment in much the way
that GATT oversees international trade —ineffect, a GATT for foreign
investment, as originally proposed by Goldberg and Kindleberger
(1970) and endorsed by many other academic specialists. Such a body
would establish a set of rules and dispute-settlement procedures aimed
at increasing the global benefits of international investment, just as
GATT does --atleast in principle —fornational policies governing
trade.
The evident reluctance of the United States and other major
industrial nations to pursue free-standing multilateral negotiations on
investment issues may be rooted in the failure of previous efforts along
similar lines. The International Trade Organization (ITO) was designed
at the end of World War II to complete the institutional framework for
international cooperation that included also the International Monetary8
Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(World Bank).
At the urgingofthe U.S. business community, the ITO draft
charter dealt specifically with national policies toward foreign direct
investment. But to the eyes of U.S. companies concerned primarily
about the security of their property abroad, the actual provisions of the
charter appeared to favor the interests of host over source countries.
The objections of the U.S. business community were one reason for the
eventual failure of the United States to ratitr the charter (Spero, 1981).
The GATT, as a more limited successor to the ITO, made no attempt to
deal with foreign investment issues.
The World Bank's International Center for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID), established in 1965, remains the only
international forum devoted entirely to the settlement of foreign
investment issues, but one that is remarkably toothless even relative to
other international bodies. Disputes must be submitted voluntarily by
both parties, precluding consideration of the most controversial issues.
Moreover, the ICSID has no power to enforce its decisions (Lipson,
1985). Yet some Latin American nations have seen even this mildest
form of governance as intruding unacceptably on national sovereignty.9
In the early postwar period, as many former colonies became
sovereign nations, the prospect for setting up an international
regulatory body that could satisfr both host and source countries grew
ever more remote. By the 1970s, the atmosphere in the major
international organizations had become openly confrontational;
demands for a "New International Economic Order" were pressed by
less-developed nations of a somewhat unified "South" upon an
unprepared "North" reeling from oil-price shocks. High on the South's
agenda were measures to enhance host-country control over
multinational corporations.
While the industrial nations were understandably slow to
acquiesce to such demands, the increased policy activism of host
countries also increased the pressure to provide some form of
international governance in this area. The nations of the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) produced a
voluntary code of conduct for multinational finns, intended primarily to
disavow the most controversial and anticompetitive business practices
attributed to multinational corporations. Voluntary codes were also
produced by the Center on Transnational Corporations of the United
Nations and by the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD).10
By the 1980s, both the investment climate and the prospects
for new types of international agreements had begun to improve. The
inclusion of investment issues on the Uruguay Round agenda was one
reflection of this improvement. After a decade or more of
experimentation with aggressive regulation of multinational firms, host
countries were concerned as much about competing to attract foreign
finns as about controlling their activities. The formerly appealing
strategies of expropriation and of "unbundllingTM direct investment --i.e.,
acquiring foreign technology and financial capital without foreign
equity participation --hadbeen somewhat discredited by the generally
disappointing results actually achieved by nations implementing them.
While policy activism toward direct investment had not been
renounced entirely, the carrot-and-stick approach had largely replaced
the stick.
A second change that also augured well for progress on
international agreements was the increased extent of intraindustry
foreign direct investment among the industrialized nations, and
especially the United States. This development blurred the distinction,
at least among industrial nations, between host and source countries.
In the 1960s, the United States was the preeminent and indeed
quintessential source country, by far the most conspicuous potential11
beneficiary of limits on nationalistic policies of host countries. By
1990, the United States remained a major source country and the
strongest voice for international action to regulate investment policies,
yet it had also become the world's most important host to direct
investment. The European Community as well as Canada and Japan
had gained a corresponding stake in placing limits on host-country
investment policies, and particularly those of the United States. The
U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, ratified in 1988, in fact went far
beyond any multilateral action contemplated in the Uruguay Round.
Like other aspects of the agreement, this may be viewed as a "leading
indicator" of trends in multilateral negotiations.
Given these developments, the 1990s may offer the first real
opportunity in many decades for comprehensive multilateral
negotiations on investment issues. Indeed, while the concept of a
GATT for investment remained alive mainly in the academic literature
during the 1970s and 1980s, by 1990 it had reemerged as a serious
proposal for action.2 For this reason, I deal with national investment
policies somewhat more broadly in this article than was actually
undertaken in the Uruguay Round negotiations, while still
corcentrating on the potential effects of such policies on location of
production and trade flows.12
NATIONAL INVESTMENT POLICIES
Although the universe of policies potentially affecting foreign
direct investments is immense, policies relevant to recent international
negotiations can be classified into two basic types: incentives for
investment and operating restrictions on investment (performance
requirements). As extremes, the first type includes the requirement of
local establishment for market access, a policy prominent in services,
while the second type includes investment prohibitions in specific
sectors as well as limits on the percentage of foreign equity
ownership.3
The Uruguay Round negotiations focused mainly on certain
performance requirements --thepolicies now known as TRIMs --that
are presumed to have direct effects on trade flows. However, not all
TRIMs are binding; non-binding TRiMs may have no effect on trade
flows.4 Moreover, almost all TRIMs are imposed in conjunction with
investment incentives. To the extent that incentives are successful in
influencing the location of production, they may be equally, if not as
transparently, regarded as trade-related measures.5
Despite a perception on the part of some U.S. officials and
some U.S.-based companies that TRIMs "constitute one of the most13
serious trade policy problems facing the international trading
community (LICIT, 1981), neither the documented incidence of
measures nor available estimates of their trade-distorting effects provide
strong support for this position. Although a laissez-faire approach
toward foreign investment is dearly the exception rather than the rule
among host countries, data from several empirical studies of policy
measures with specific trade effects yield surprisingly little consensus
on their relative frequency and importance.
A U.S. Department of Commerce study of 24,666 foreign
affiliates of U.S. companies found that in 1977 just over a quarter of
these benefited from some type of incentives to investment, while on
average 14 percent were subject to one or more performance
requirement. However, only 2 percent of U.S. affiliates were subject to
a minimum export requirement, 3 percent to a maximum import level,
3 percent to a minimum level of local inputs, and 8 percent to a
minimum labor local requirement, with about 6 percent overall affected
by one or more of these measures (U.S. Department of Commerce,
1981). In sharp contrast, a much smaller but more detailed World
Bank study of 74 investments found that more than half were subject
to explicit trade-related performance requirements; however, many of
these were considered non-binding by the respondents (Guisinger,14
1986, p. 92).
One important finding of the Commerce study in light of
subsequent developments in the Uruguay Round was that a much
larger percentage of U.S. subsidiaries in less-developed countries were
subject to performance requirements than in developed countries. Both
the Commerce and World Bank studies confirmed that TRIMs were
much more prevalent than average in some manufacturing industries,
notably automobiles. These conclusions support the view that less-
developed countries rely on investment measures as an integral part of
overall industrial-development policies.
A study of 682 investments commissioned by the U.S. Overseas
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) found 40 percent of all OPIC-
supported projects subject to actual or potential trade-related
investment performance requirements. However, because of OPIC
policies regarding eligibility, these investments cannot be regarded as a
random sample of all U.S. investments either by host country or by
industry. In particular, no automobile investment were included.6
The studies revealed considerable variation across host 4
countriesin preferred policy strategies. Approaches favored by
individual host countries ranged from Mexico's explicit published
performance requirements, through France's tax breaks tied to job15
creation and exports, to Ireland's cash grants to subsidiaries producing
for export (Moran and Pearson, 1988, pp. 121-122). In the United
States no fewer than 24 state governments were found to offer
investment incentives, prompting the observation that although the
United States has no local-content legislation, "it would be
disingenuous to suggest that the pursuit by certain states of foreign-
owned automobile plants has no impact on the country's trade flows"
(p. 122).
While diverging markedly on the relative importance of TRIMs,
all studies have noted the large number of nearly equivalent policy
instruments used by any one host. For example, the World Bank study
found that in a group of ten developed and less-developed host
countries, governments used an average of 22 different investment
policies of various types. Although no government used all available
measures in the case of each investment, the average number of
instruments per project was "surprisingly high" (Guisinger, 1986, p.
84).
Since an equivalent net incentive could be provided much more
simply, some investigators concluded that the nontransparency achieved
through multiple and apparently contradictory policy instruments might
in fact serve the interests of the host government and perhaps even the16
foreign firm. The availability of multiple incentives and disencentives
could enhance the ability of the host to act as a discriminating
monopolist, i.e., to extract a larger share of the profits associated with
a particular project. On the other hand, an investing firm would be
better able to conceal from potential competitors --andperhaps also
from a suspicious public --theextent of preferential treatment
bestowed on its activity.
Even harder to pin down than the extent of TRIMs is the
actual effect on subsidiaries subject to these policies. In two-thirds of
the projects surveyed in the World Bank study, managers reported that
the location decision was affected by incentive policies. However, the
question posed was whether the same location would have been
chosen in the absence of host incentives but the same performance
requirements, and with all investment policies of alternative sites
unchanged. Since performance requirements are almost always paired
with incentives, and since there is often active competition among
localities for new investments, the two-thirds figure is clearly an
extreme upper bound on the fraction of investments thus influenced.
Survey evidence suggests a rather minor effect of the
performance requirements ttiemselves on exports and imports. Many
TRIMs were perceived to be non-binding, while others merely speeded17
up changes in trade that firms would have undertaken even in the
absence of the policies. As already noted, such reports may reflect ex-
ante versus ex-post optimization by corporations. However, as Safarian
(1983, p. 612) has observed, reporting may be incomplete because
companies are reluctant to appear critical of "the wielders of regulatory
and fiscal power" in host countries.
THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE GLOBALLY INTEGRAThD FIRM8
National investment policies, whether of host or source
countries, seek to enhance benefits derived from the presence of
multinational corporations (MNCs) .Thismay entail rent-shifting,
changes in the pattern of production and trade, or some combination
of these. While rent-shifting affects primarily the distribution of
benefits within and between countries from an investment, changes in
the pattern of production or trade may improve overall economic
efficiency by correcting a market failure or achieve certain "non-
economic" objectives of policy makers.10 To analyze the potential
consequences of investment policies, it is useful to begin by considering
the role of direct investments in global production and trade, first in a
fully injegrated global economy without national boundaries and then
in a world divided into sovereign nations.18
In a world without national boundaries or other barriers to the
free movement of goods and productive factors, maximization of profits
requires minimization of cost. The location of each step in any
production process is therefore determined by cost alone, so as to
minimize the overall cost of serving any particular market. Depending
on scale economies and the relative costs of moving goods versus
required inputs, a given process may be carried out at a single location
or at many locations around the world.
In a fully integrated global economy, observed trade among
regions may be based on classical comparative advantage, scale
economies, or a combination of the two. Some finns operate at a
single location and carry out only a single process; any required
coordination of the activities of individual finns is then achieved
entirely through arm's-length (market) transactions. For other firms,
coordination of activities in multiple locations is performed by a single
management --"internalized"by the firm, in the language of industrial
organization. However, since internalization has costs of its own, the
existence of multiple-location or multiple-product finns has to be
explained in terms of corresponding increases in efficiency over what
could be attained with separate management and market coordination.19
Now contrast production and trade under the more realistic
assumption that the world economy is divided into multiple political
jurisdictions. A central feature of this case is that profit maximization
no longer implies cost minimization. Along with whatever factors
determine the cost of serving any given market in a fully integrated
economy, location of production in a multi-country world must also
reflect any policy-induced elements of profitability, including tariffs and
other trade policies, taxes and subsidies, and policies toward foreign
investment. These policies can affect profits through either costs or
revenues. In particular, higher profits may be associated with both
higher revenues and higher production costs, as might occur with
induced local production to serve a protected market.
Where does direct investment fit into this scheme? Whenever
multiple-location firms span national boundaries, the pattern of profit-
maximizing production by definition includes foreign direct investment.
However, since firms operating in foreign locations typically incur costs
higher than otherwise similar local finns, the existence of such
operations again has to be explained in terms of greater firm
profitability.
Modern theories of foreign direct investment rest on the
existence of a firm-specific advantage that is most profitably exploited20
through managerial control over operations in multiple countries.11
This firm-specific advantage may also provide the basis for the
existence of multiple-location operations within a single integrated
economy. However, because production costs are necessarily
minimized in the case of a single integrated economy but not in a
multi-country world, it is useful to separate direct investments into
three categories.
The first category of investment, which I call cost-driven,
consists of those parts of multiple-location operations simply relabeled
as foreign direct investments when national boundaries are
superimposed on what was previously assumed to be a single
integrated economy.12 Obviously, the newly designated wforeign
investors" in this category are a subset of all firms that would engage
in multiple-plant operations in the single-economy case. These
investments are characterized by strong locational motives along with
significant internalization benefits. Extractive industries provide
numerous examples of cost-driven investments. Other important
categories are consumer services, e.g., retail banking and hotels, and
investments complementary to local sales, such as distribution and
service facilities.21
Although this category includes all investments not subject to
any specific investment policies, an investment would also be
appropriately included even when it is subject to investment policies as
long as actual production and trade decisions are not affected by the
policies. This may be true because the policies are aimed primarily at
extracting rents rather than changing production decisions, because
policies are not expected to be binding, because policies overall play
only a minor role in the firm's decisions relative to other locational
advantages or political stability, or because any incentive package
offered by one potential host is largely matched by others. The latter
two possibilities may apply in the case of "footloose" activities that are
the object of active bidding by rival would-be hosts.
The second and third categories consist of those direct
investments actually induced by the assumed division of the world into
sovereign political jurisdictions, rather than merely relabeled. In the
second category, which I call policy-driven, are investments directly
influenced by national policies, including those located and operated to
serve a protected market, to benefit from favorable tax treatment or
other incentives, or to meet local-content requirements applied to
existing operations. From the point of view of the firm, such
investments represent a second-best response to market fragmentation.22
Most entail substitution between local production and foreign
production, with higher production cost to the firm,13 and
corresponding changes in trade. Many manufacturing investments in
both developed and less-developed countries, such as those in
electronics and automobiles, belong in this category. Such investments
may be either import-substituting or export-oriented.
Investments in the third category, which I call border-driven,
are not direct responses to specific policies; rather, they are responses
to the fact of multiple political jurisdictions. Such investments have no
easily predictable impact on local production, trade, or global
efficiency.14 Establishment of local production may be a means to
enhance the firm's credibility as a market participant, whether in the
eyes of consumers or of potential competitors. Also, since production
and market conditions in sovereign political units are likely to be less
than perfectly correlated, an increase in the extent of direct investment
may be part of the firm's risk-management strategy for a multi-country
world. Border-driven investments are designed to capture the benefits
of being multinational, rather than the advantages of locating the
finn's activities in any specific place.
Although it would be impractical to apply this classification to
actual investments, the distinctions among the three types provide23
some insight into the issues arising both from national investment
policies and from attempts to limit their use. The first two categories
of cost-driven and policy-driven investments correspond roughly to two
potential objectives of national policy measures: rent extraction (with
no intended effect on resource allocation) and resource reallocation.15
In cost-driven investments, firm location decisions are
unchanged from the case of the integrated world economy. However,
the imposition of national boundaries implies potential competition
with other tax jurisdictions, as well as with foreign owners and
workers, for whatever rents are associated with the firm-specific
advantage. Taxes, together with rules on transfer pricing and
remittances, are the main policy tools used to extract such rents on
behalf of the host (or source) government.16 Taxation may have little
or no direct effect on production and trade. However, rent may also
be extracted implicitly via (binding) performance requirements that
reduce firm profits.
For policy-driven investments, rent extraction remains a
potential goal of policy makers, but this is achieved in conjunction
with changes in global production that are themselves policy-induced.17
Since most changes in production move the firm away from its
preferred (profit-maximizing) position, only marginal results are likely24
to be achieved without the inclusion of policy measures to enhance
firm rents. For example, a tariff may be used to protect the domestic
market from imports of a good that would otherwise be supplied from
abroad. If the supplying firm possesses a firm-specific advantage
sufficiently valuable to offset the greater cost of producing locally, it
will now shift the location of some production activity to the host
country.18
Although somewhat artificial, this classification is helpful in
understanding the conflict within the GATT over the appropriate
treatment of investment policies. To the extent that investments are
cost-driven and policies mainly shift rents without affecting the
allocation of resources, there is little resulting impact on trade (or on
overall economic efficiency). However, whether this is true in any
particular situation depends on both the policies and the underlying
economic forces.
Some less-developed countries have therefore argued that the
GATT should focus not on the measures themselves, but only on their
effects on trade flows, and then only when the resulting impact on
trade --ifthere is such an impact --issignificant and the resulting
injury to other countries sufficiently great to merit a sacrifice of
national sovereignty by the host. In contrast, the United States has25
favored an approach that begins by identifring particular measures that
may be expected to affect trade --akind of ground up the usual
suspect? approach. But in either case, if significant trade effects are
the criterion for including investment measures in international
negotiations, a large set of policies, including most taxes and many
types of incentives, is thus omitted entirely from consideration.19
THE ECONOMIC CASE FOR INTERNATIONAL ACTION
As with policies toward trade, in practice national policies
aimed at investment tend to reduce global efficiency via suboptimal
allocation of resources in production and via associated rent-seeking
activities. An important difference, however, is that investment policies
are less likely than those aimed directly at trade flows to reduce the
country's own aggregate welfare. International cooperation may
therefore be even more important than in the case of trade in avoiding
a "prisoner's dilemma" situation.20
For a country small enough to have no appreciable effect on
world prices, the cost of tariff protection is borne almost entirely by
the country itself. Even for large countries, the net effect of protection
on national welfare is typically negative. But when a tariff creates an
incentive for import-substituting direct investment, and investment26
policies are then used to extract some part of the rents generated by
foreign-controlled production for the local market, the country may in
fact gain.21 However, the foreign investor will also gain (or expect to
gain), at least relative to the situation of protection but no investment.
The corresponding losses, although typically larger in the aggregate,
will be spread among other competing suppliers but may be small for
any one of them. An important implication is that the "problem" of
TRIMs is at least in part a problem of incomplete liberalization of
trade. Without tariffs, quotas, and other import barriers, there would
be less rent to extract and thus less scope for performance
requirements.
Efforts to bring investment policies under GATT discipline have
come principally from the United States and have been propelled by
the perceived interests of some U.S.-based multinational firms. Yet
while there is no question that many U.S.-based firms have been
affected by TRIMs, the evidence is far from conclusive that source
countries like the United States have been harmed significantly by the
use of these policies. In many instances, the host country and the
source country can both benefit on net at the expense of numerous
"third" nations, each of which however bears only a small part of the
cost.27
Moreover, there is still less evidence to suggest that trade-
related investment policies currently exert an important independent
influence on global patterns of production and trade, especially in
relation, say, to the remaining egregious and well-documented barriers
in textiles and apparel and in agriculture. As suggested above, the
main effect of many investment measures at least in the medium term
is to shift rents between the source and the host country.
The conventional argument for inclusion of investment
measures within the GATT framework thus appears to rest on shaky
ground, while any favorable influence on global efficiency of GATT
efforts is in any case limited by the agreement to focus exclusively on
the trade-distorting effects of such measures. Moreover, the decision to
tackle investment measures primarily on the basis of their presumed
role as nontariff trade distortions neglects important interactions
between trade restriction and direct investment as j determinants of
the global pattern of production. Changes in trade policies have
implications for foreign investment decisions; conversely, the effects of
trade policies on productive efficiency and income distribution within
and across countries depend crucially on the extent of induced changes
in foreign investment. National investment policies can thus have an
important though typically indirect influence on the consequences of28
protection and of trade liberalization. For this reason, national
investment policies may indeed be critical to the success of the GATT
even though these policies in themselves do not constitute important
distortions of trade. Whether in the GAIT or an alternative forum, the
need is to evaluate the efficiency consequences of all national investment
policies, not merely the subset designated as TRIMs.NOTES
1. As Richardson (1984, p. 2) has observed, in the new environment it
is "harder to identifr foreign policies, much less their effects."
Richardson uses such terms as "opaqueness" and "intricacy" to describe
policies including performance requirements, tax forgiveness, credit
guarantees, and implicit subsidies, noting that such policies are much
more likely than straightforward trade taxes or explicit subsidies to give
rise to allegations of unfairness and discrimination.
2. For example, Bergsten (1990) included a GATF for investment among
four major steps to "make a quantum leap in the effectiveness of global
trade arrangements."
3. See Guisinger (1987, pp. 218-219) for a comprehensive taxonomy of
investment policies that classifies 46 instruments according to the specific
channels through which they affect profitability.
4. Greenaway (1990) has observed that such TRIMs provide a form of
insurance for the host country, raising the likelihood that anticipated
benefits from an investment project will in fact materialize. As noted
below, a TRIM may be binding ex ante but not ex post, i.e., after
resources have been irrevocably committed to a particular project. Thus,
managers of existing foreign subsidiaries may underestimate the extent to
which performance requirements actually influence firm behavior.30
5. The list of TRIMs specified by the U.S. delegation to the negotiations
included incentives as well as performance requirements, noting that
"incentives are often granted in exchange for a specified local content
I
levelor some form of market protection" (USTR, 1987).
6. Moran and Pearson (1987, 1988). These papers also contain a useful
comparison with data from other sources, including an unpublished study
carried out by U.S. International Trade Commission.
7. Japanese automobile investments in the United States have been
interpreted by Bhagwati (1985) as "quid pro quo" investments, made by
foreign suppliers to forestall future protection rather than merely to
benefit from anticipated future protection.
8. Most foreign direct investment, whether in terms of number or value
of controlled foreign enterprises, is carried out by multinational firms that
produce and sell in many countries.Cross-border investments, as
between the United States and Canada, may be quite different in their
characteristics from other types of FDI and may thus respond differently
to national regulatory policies. Here I concentrate on the activities of
multinational corporations rather than smaller bi-national ones.
9. Whether the benefits in question are those of the nation as a whole31
or of particular interest groups is a complicated issue that cannot be
sorted out here. In the extreme, the entire regulatory effort may be
appropriately viewed as an exercise in domestic politics, with regulators
seeking to look tough rather than submissive in highly publicized
confrontations with the local embodiments of foreign imperialism.
10. Economists use the term "non-economics to describe goals that entail
some sacrifice of national income in favor of other objectives, such as
achieving a preferred distribution of income or self-sufficiency in a
particular activity. For a further discussion of host motivation and
implications for efficiency and trade, see Greenaway (1990). Recent
papers by Richardson (1990a, 1990b) provide theoretical analyses of the
two most important TRIMS, export incentives and local content
requirements, as well as references to previous theoretical literature.
Theoretical models have been helpful in comparing TRIMs to other trade
distortions. However, the theoretical literature has typically abstracted
from the full set of options available to globally integrated firms and host
governments and has not explored the negotiated character of most
investment regimes. As the discussion below suggests, the actual impact
on trade of a given investment measure cannot be determined without
reference to this broader decision-making context.32
11. This insight is conventionally attributed to Hyrner (1960) and was
promulgated by Kindleberger (1969), among others.Caves (1982)
provides a comprehensive survey. On internalization as the characteristic
activity of the multinational fixm, see Rugman (1980) and McCulloch
(1985).
12. At the margin, some location decisions may be altered merely by the
division of the economy into sovereign parts. Even without an active role
for policy, e.g., policies that discriminate against foreign goods or foreign-
controlled production, the extra costs of operating in two political
jurisdictions may affect resource allocation. Some markets previously
served by controlled local production may now be served via trade; in
other cases, a local firm may now have a cost advantage over the foreign
one.
13. To the extent that national policies succeed in correcting market
failures or offsetting other distortions, social cost need not rise.
14. Where these motivations are important, changes in the degree of
political and economic integration can either increase or decrease the
extent of local production for activities characterized by scale economies.33
15. Along similar lines, Greenaway (1990) has distinguished a rent-
shifting target and an insurance target of host investment regimes. As
used by Greenaway, the insurance target refers both to policies intended
to reduce host uncertainty about future outcomes--which need not be
binding--and to policies intended to alter resource allocation, especially
ex ante. In all cases, some resources are absorbed in the "rent-seeking"
process itself, e.g., costs of lawyers and other specialists engaged in
negotiations between the firm and source or host country.
16. As Caves (1982, p. 240) has observed, "gains that host countries
enjoy from taxing foreign investments have been sorely neglected in
debates over MNEs....benefits and costs most commonly proclaimed either
defy our best measuring instruments or are entirely conjectural; the
substantial gains generated by the tax system often go unnoticed."
17. The distinction between the categories depends to some degree on
the time horizon. A policy measure that simply reduces a firm's after-tax
profits in the short or even medium term could influence decisions on
future investments.
18. The conventional wisdom holds that protection of the local market
necessarily stimulates import-competing foreign investment. This need
not be the case if the erstwhile foreign suppliers lack any significant firm-34
specific advantage. Local firms rather than multinationals will then
capture the protected market. The apparel industry is highly protected
in all industrial countries, yet the extent of DFI is minor relative to
manufacturing overall.
19. Bilateral tax treaties have dealt successfully with some of the tax
issues at the national level. However, incentives are often applied at the
regional or local level and are thus less susceptible to international
agreements.
20.It should be emphasized that the policy process itself and the
attempts of firms to shape policy and to maximize their benefits within
any policy environment also use resources. Even when the location and
operation of a footloose investment is in the end unaffected by
competition among rival would-be hosts, the rent.seeking process may
entail a substantial social cost.
21. The most obvious channel is via the host-country taxation of
multinational profits. See Caves (1982, Chapter 10). However, profits
may also be taxed implicitly through performance requirements imposed
on foreign-controlled firms.REFERENCES
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